This next-to-last post will examine the exegetical and hermeneutical method Augustine employs in constructing his teachings on grace and providence. Before I begin, I want to state my deep indebtedness to Donato Ogliari and his fine work Gratia et Certamen [Grace and Struggle]. Most of the real research in this section is his and I have only summarized it. One may wonder why this section comes later in this series of posts than his assumptions and the examination of the sources of those assumptions. It should be clear that the driving force behind Augustine’s theological construction that leads him to the precipice of determinism is neither Scripture nor the received tradition—rather it is his reaction to and accommodation to his pagan past. Now the Christian Augustine must be able to reconcile his imported assumptions with the teachings of the faith he now embraces. In order to do so, it seems he attempts to bend Scripture to fit his already-existing theological ideas, and seems content to read what he desires into the text of Scripture rather than draw his theological conclusions out of it. When it comes to biblical exegesis and theological reflection, Augustine certainly places the proverbial cart before the proverbial horse.
The first text Augustine abuses is 1 Cor 4:7, “What do you have that you did not receive? And if you did receive it, why do you boast as if you had not received it?” In its context, Paul utters these words as he chides the Corinthians who are setting themselves up to be superior to him, even though he was the one through whom they heard and believed. Augustine removes it completely from its context and states it as a universal truth, because as so, it becomes a prooftext for his peculiar version of grace. Any good that a human being does is now, according to his misuse of 1 Cor 4:7, a gift of God, because due to the inherent evil of humanity, any good must come from without.1 Furthermore, his interpretation of 1 Cor 4:7 is the foundation of his more famous interpretation of Romans 9 and the latter cannot be understood without the former.2 Although patristic hermeneutical methods were quite different than the ones employed by contemporary Evangelicals, Augustine’s misuse of 1 Cor 4:7 is a tremendous blunder. What makes it especially bad is that (as Ogliari shows in footnote 1) it becomes the entryway into his hermeneutical maze leading to divine determinism.
A second text that Augustine misconstrues is Song of Solomon 4:8. He bases his interpretation on the Latin version of the faulty LXX translation that renders “From the beginning of faith” rather than the Hebrew which yields “From the peak of Amana.”3 Here, Ogliari shows that Augustine interpreted the passage to mean that Christ invites his bride to join him from the beginning of faith, which allows Augustine to use this verse as a prooftext for “the precedence of divine action with regard to the act of faith itself.”4 So this mistranslation becomes a useful tool in the argument that his determinism is “biblical.”
Augustine’s third hermeneutical blunder is mapping the words of Jesus in Matt 20:16 (“Many are called but few are chosen”) onto Paul’s understanding of “called” in Rom 8:28–30. Ogliari insightfully notes,
Augustine adopts and maintains, in his exegetical approach to the Pauline pericope, the Matthean distinction of the [many called, few chosen], a distinction which, in reality, does not correspond to Paul’s semantic world. In fact, by the term [called] the Apostle meant all those who effectively respond to divine call, whereas the interpretation of the bishop of Hippo, restricting the Pauline meaning of the term, attaches the effectiveness of the divine call to God’s propositum, that is to God’s predestination. In this way Augustine’s exegesis, in accordance with his own theological presuppositions, posits the effectiveness of man’s call (and therefore of his salvation) in God alone.5
Thus Augustine equivocates the meaning of the word “call” between Matthew and Paul and thereby creates another prooftext for the soteriological and cosmological theorems that derive from his assumptions.
Perhaps the area in which Augustine deviates the most from the received Christian tradition is his interpretation of Romans 9. The Gallic monks correctly accused Augustine of interpreting that passage as no one had ever done before in the history of Christianity.6
As Ogliari writes, “Augustine did not develop his theological construction on predestination by basing himself on the exegetical results of his Christian predecessors. Rather he relied on his own, independent interpretation of the Pauline letters, the emphasis being on the letter to the Romans.”7 That is, Augustine leaves the received tradition behind when dealing with Romans 9, replacing “a biblical approach” with “a speculative one.”8 As is well-known, his interpretation of Romans 9:10–29 is what caused Augustine to abandon his teaching of predestination via foreknowledge.
In his interpretation of Romans 9, Augustine replaces Paul’s primary aim (the salvation of Israel as a people) with “the grace of faith and on the necessity on not boasting about one’s own merits deriving from works.”9 He completely shifted the corporate nature of Romans 9 to the predestination of individuals. In it, he makes the distinction between the general call of God and the deterministic special call, as Jacob is elected (special) while Esau is called (general).10 The potter and clay mean that God can do whatever he wants with his creation and the initiative is always his, since the lump of clay (massa) has no right to ask of the potter what he is doing.11 Ogliari writes, “So for Augustine, the term massa becomes a forceful tool to describe the powerless, sinful situation which humanity finds itself (massa peccati), together with the damnation that goes with it (massa damnata), and from which only those whom God’s decree has predestined will be delivered.”12 Furthermore, Ogliari observes,
God’s predestination, in fact, presupposes a primordial idea of ‘origin’ (in this case Adam’s ‘original’ sin) in which all men share and from which they are excluded by God’s election. It is as though this ‘origin’ were an amorphous sinful substance (a sort of ur-qualifying element) constituting the physical and moral structure of human beings. Man has no right whatsoever to ask God the reason for this primordial sinful state, precisely as the vessel is not expected to ask the potter, who is shaping it, why it is being given that particular form rather than another one (Rom 9:20–1).13
Augustine has now made his entire deterministic theory fit neatly into the structure of the words of Romans 9, taken apart from the context of chapters 9–11 or of the letter as a whole.
The entire Augustinian tradition built on the foundation the bishop laid. But did he lay the correct foundation? One who does not share his initial assumptions at laid out at the beginning of this chapter would have to say no. Ogliari summarizes the opposition to Augustine well,
Thus, determined to safeguard his conclusion that any activity on man’s part to procure grace must be excluded, Augustine bypasses Paul’s intention, which was indeed very different. The Apostle wanted to emphasize that human activity, in relation to God, is always a matter of receiving and cherishing that which comes from him, without excluding the part which man has to play. Moreover, for Paul predestination has to be understood in strict connection with Christ’s activity. In the Son of God, who is the utmost revelation of divine grace and benevolence, God’s universal plan of salvation is made manifest, and only in Christ and through him can the predestination of man be posited and comprehended. Finally, whereas for Paul the concept of predestination envisaged the possibility of all men being saved, Augustine introduces a sort of dualism. Replacing Paul’s unitary and soteriologically oriented view, he defines the concept of God’s bestowal (or not) of vera gratia [true grace], resulting either to predestination to grace and glory of the pauci (the elect) or rejection of the multi (the reprobates). And so, while depending in many respects on Paul’s thought on issues such as God’s absolute and free initiative, the gratuity of predestination, the importance of permission to sin, Augustine’s ‘theological’ exegesis of Rom 9:10–29 cannot be justified. Rather than drawing enlightenment from Paul’s primary intention, as expressed in those passages from which he claims to derive his doctrine of predestination, the bishop of Hippo falls, perhaps malgre soi [against his will], into the unhappy perspective of reading (and looking for sustenance in) the Pauline pericope through the spectacles of his own viewpoint on absolute grace.14
To summarize, Ogliari writes, “In this way Augustine’s exegesis, in accordance with his own theological presuppositions, posits the effectiveness of man’s call (and therefore of his salvation) in God alone.”15 Thus Augustine took the words of Paul and forced his theological theorems upon them. Jacob, Esau, and the potter and clay became metaphors for the absolute, deterministic grace of God in accordance with his own theological assumptions. Again, Augustine never hearkens back to the words of Jeremiah or Malachi that Paul is referencing, and never takes into account the use of figurative language (synechdoche, polar contrast, and metaphor) in the Hebrew prophetic genre. It is Paul’s words, at literal “face value,” with a good dash of Augustine’s theological assumptions all mixed together.
Once Romans 9 has been interpreted to be the “clear” teaching of the absolute, deterministic nature of divine grace, Augustine (and all who follow his assumptions) then force other Bible texts that read differently to fall in line with the reading of Romans 9. For Augustine, Romans 9 becomes a controlling text of Scripture because it can be made to say what his theological assumptions dictate when the text is wrenched from context (as has been shown Augustine was a master at doing). Perhaps the text of Scripture that suffers the worst from Augustine’s system on grace and determinism is 1 Tim 2:4. For Augustine, the text cannot mean what it says because of basic logical deduction from his assumptions. Some are not saved; and the will of God always comes to pass. Therefore, those who are not saved God did not will to elect. So in what sense can God will all men to be saved? Augustine answers this as best he can by saying that no one is saved unless God wills it. He continues with perhaps the clearest statement of determinism he makes when he writes “If he wills, then what he wills must necessarily be.”16 His conclusion on the subject is that “all” must mean “all kinds” because the will of the omnipotent is always undefeated.17 If God had indeed willed every single human to be saved, then that is what would have occurred.18 Every disciple of Augustine has followed him on this interpretation to the present day.
Ogliari shows how Augustine’s assumptions drove his interpretation. Commenting on Augustine’s Enchiridion 24.95, He writes, “Rather than explaining 1 Tim 2:4 according to Paul’s intention, he is more preoccupied by saving the absolute transcendence and infallibility of God’s plans within the framework of sovereign grace. The fact that not all men are actually saved cannot simply be ascribed to the ill will of those who refuse to be saved. If it were so, it would mean that God’s will were deficient, and that it could be easily jeopardized by man’s free will.”20 He continues that God’s will, on the contrary, is, translated from Latin, “certain, immutable, and most efficacious.”20 Once God’s sovereign, deterministic will to save is in place, 1 Tim 2:4 cannot be interpreted as written.
With all of the above, Ogliari summarizes, “The chief methodological fault in Augustine’s approach is that he moves from the level of a general, metaphysical principle, viz. God’s universal salvific will, to the pragmatic level of its realization in history, at least in the way he ‘imagines’ that God’s salvific will happens concretely. For Augustine, in fact, it is a perspicua veritas [clearly expressed truth] that only the predestined are saved.”20 His theological assumptions just will not allow any real idea that God wants all human beings to be saved. He must reinterpret any Scripture that would describe universal intent toward salvation in order to hold his theory together.
Given all of the above, could Augustine be rightly charged with innovation? It would seem so, since he clearly departed from the received teaching of the church on matters such as grace, original sin, and unconditional election.22 Ogliari strongly agrees that Augustine is indeed guilty of innovation as he writes,
We realize immediately that Augustine’s dealing with the doctrine of predestination, which finds its definitive formulation here, is innovative on both a terminological and a doctrinal level. Firstly, when compared with the way that the ancient Fathers of the Church understood it, the bishop of Hippo’s emphasis on predestination to grace, rather than on predestination to glory, becomes very relevant. It entails, in fact, a shift from an eschatological orientation (where God leads the life of man with his unwavering mercy) to a meta-historical and meta-temporal orientation, where the divine decrees about human beings, their historical development, and their eschatological goal, are already fixed ab aeternitae [from eternity]. Of course, God’s grace and its efficacy constitute the conditio sine qua non [condition without which not] for man to share at all in the divine glory, which is and remains the final goal. And yet Augustine prefers to speak of predestination in relation to God’s eternally spoken decrees rather than to God’s eschatological future.
Moreover, the bishop of Hippo’s understanding of predestination brings into question the ultimate significance of God’s oeconomia salutis [economy of salvation]. If predestination, rather than being considered from an eschatological perspective, is firmly established in God’s eternal decrees, then an unbridgeable dichotomy would be discovered between God’s and man’s agency. In other words, if the concept of predestination does not take into account the concrete arena of human existence wherein man makes choices and strives for salvation, if it is primarily viewed as an immobilis veritas [unmovable truth] stemming from a transcendent (pre-)-disposition of God, located in his eternal decrees, then the problem to be accounted for would indeed be that of the compatibility of God’s transcendence with his commitment in history and the way their interplay is envisaged.23
Not only is innovation a problem here, but As Ogliari has noted, the absolute nature of grace opens up a whole host of other theological issues, not the least of which is destroying the balance between God’s transcendence and his immanent work in the world. To summarize this section, Augustine failed to grasp two things: that he was reading his own theological assumptions into Scripture and the far-reaching implications of his assumptions. The last post in this series will briefly summarize how both of these points were critiqued in his own time.
Dr. Gifford is Head of Department of General Studies and professor of theology and church history at New Life Theological Seminary, Charlotte, NC
1See Ogliari, Gratia et Certamen, 155 – 6, as well as the footnotes on 156 showing the extensive dependence in Augustine’s own writings on his particular interpretation of 1 Cor 4:7. I won’t repeat Ogliari’s exhaustive research here.
2Ibid., 326.
3Ibid., 290. As always, Ogliari provides multiple primary source citations from Augustine on the point.
4Ibid.
5Ibid., 335–6.
6Ibid., 336, n. 169
7Ibid., 310.
8Ibid., 336.
9Ibid.
10Ibid., 315.
11Ibid., 340 – 1, The massa is the lump of clay, representing all of humanity according to Augustine.
12Ibid., 343
13Ibid., 344–5.
14Ibid., 338.
15Ibid., 336.
16Augustine, Enchiridion 27.103.
17For this and other types of such “creative exegesis,” see Augustine, Enchiridion, 103 and Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, 14.
18Rist, Augustine, 271 n. 40 states, consistent with the argument in this chapter, that Augustine’s views on grace were not the product of an old man, but were quite consistent beginning with his letter to Simplician in 396.
19Ogliaria, Gratia et Certamen, 363.
20Ibid.
21Ibid., 365–6.
22On the latter, see for example Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.37.
23Ogliari, Gratia et Certamen, 323–4.
Below are links to the entire series by Dr. Gifford:
- Coming Series on Saint Augustine and Southern Baptists by Dr. James D. Gifford Jr
- Augustine and Southern Baptists: an Introduction
- Augustine and Southern Baptists: Augustine and Divine Omnipotence
- Augustine and Southern Baptists: Augustine and Human Nature: Part 3A; Part 3B
- Augustine and Southern Baptists: The Upshot of Augustine's Assumptions: Divine Determinism
- Augustine and Southern Baptists: Augustine's Exegetical and Hermeneutical Method
- Augustine and Southern Baptists: Augustine's Critics and Legacy: Part A; Part B
Fascinating stuff, Dr. Gifford! I have enjoyed this series very much. I think you have uncovered some serious issues with Augustine's hermeneutical and exegetical method. I am in the process of digesting it all and certainly look forward to your final installment. On a related note, and contrary to many Reformed interpretations of Augustine, I find it interesting that he did not assert a limited substitution for sin with respect to the extent of the atonement, but rather affirmed Christ died for the sins of all people. His comment about Christ "redeeming" Judas is especially strong (see his Exposition of Psalm 69 in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 1st series, ed. P. Schaff (1888; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2004), 8:309. He also speaks of Christ dying for the sins of "the whole world" where in context it is impossible to understand "world" as anything less than all humanity (for example, Ibid., 8:471-72). Though Augustine gets it wrong on Romans 9, I think he gets it right on the extent of the atonement.
Posted by: David L. Allen | 2013.02.01 at 06:10 PM
Hi JIM G.
I thought to share this with you. It is an excerpt from Montague Brown's (St. Anselm College) work entitled:
'Augustine On Freedom And God'
"Augustine wrote much about the relationship between God’s activity and human freedom. Early
and late in his career, he insists on two truths: God is the cause of every activity and we have
freedom of choice. He does not mean that our actions are both determined and free. If this is
what compatibilism means, then Augustine is not a compatibilist. He simply insists on human
freedom and denies that God’s providence takes it away. But neither does he mean that our free
actions are not caused by God. This would be a metaphysical impossibility as well as heretical.
If being free from God is what libertarianism means, then Augustine is not a libertarian. The best
we can do philosophically to explain how both propositions are true is negative: we can show
that it is not possible to deny either one. We cannot deny that everything comes from God, for
from any exercise of our reason thinking about the world, we come to the knowledge of the
existence of God the creator, source of all that is. Nor can we to deny that we have free choice,
for without it “we” cannot act at all. The only possible positive explanation is theological. In
Christ are both divine activity and human freedom. We live and act in grace by freely entering
into a covenant freely offered by God."
if you are interested, you can read the rest of it on the following site:
http://www.anselm.edu/Documents/Institute%20for%20Saint%20Anselm%20Studies/Abstracts/4.5.3.2h_22Brown.pdf
good luck on your research and writing and thank you for sharing it with all of us . . . do we see a book coming some day? I hope so.
Posted by: Christiane | 2013.02.01 at 09:17 PM
Thank you Dr. Allen for your encouragement. I have not studied Augustine's views on the atonement, but I have an idea and want to run it by you to see what you think, since this is your area of expertise.
Limited atonement, it seems to me, is a logical deduction from two premises. The first is unconditional individual election (which Augustine believed). The second is a strongly objective view of the atonement, which, I believe, Augustine did not have. As a 5th century church father, his operating paradigm would have been (what we know as) a more classical model of atonement. Do you think that, without the overly-objective interpretation of the atonement, it is even possible to arrive at LA? The Eastnever so objectified the atonement, and never bought into Augustine's determinism. Thus LA is a foreign concept in Eastern Orthodoxy.
Moreover, I wonder if Augustine's turn to the individual in the decree is what precipitated such an objective turn in atonement models. I think the point can be argued. It seems to work out given centuries of time for doctrinal development. Augustine's 5th-century determinism led to Anselm's 12th-century atonement objectivity to the 14th-century Augustinian revival to the 16th-century Reformation and penal substitution. Just an idea...what do you think?
Jim G.
Posted by: Jim G. | 2013.02.01 at 09:33 PM
Thanks for the link, Christiane.
While Brown makes a good argument from the sources he uses, I don't think he surveys the breadth of Augustine's writing on the subject. Brown limits himself to "On the Free Choice of the Will" which was largely written before Augustine's "conversion" to grace in around 395 and "Grace and Free Will" from late in his life. He also consults "Confessions" and "City of God," 2 of Augustine's 3 greatest works. In between the beginning and the end of his career lies the polemics with the Pelagians and the Gallic monks. (Key works from this period largely ignored by Brown include "To Simplician," "On Rebuke and Grace," "Enchiridion," and "On the Predestination of the Saints.") Much of his views on nature and grace are hammered out there, sources that Brown omits. The tension that Brown has Augustine seemingly happy to live with is settled differently in the heat of battle with his theological opponents. I think it would have been good of Brown to offer a more complete picture of Augustine's ideas.
I hope to include these posts as a book chapter on a larger book arguing against the deterministic model of providence. I envision the book to be in three sections. The first will be the historical development of determinism. The second will be a theological argument against determinism. Finally, in the third section, I will put forth a model of providence that I think will be faithful to both Scripture and the majority of the great tradition. At least that is the plan. Thanks again.
Jim G.
Posted by: Jim G. | 2013.02.02 at 12:36 AM
I do agree that LA is a logical deduction from the notion of unconditional individual predestination viewed from the Augustinian/Dortian perspective of its proponents. As you know, it is debated whether Augustine held a penal substitutionary understanding of the atonement. Clearly all the Fathers held some form of substitutionary atonement. It seems also clear that they did not have the developed penal aspects as we find in Calvin and the later Reformed. If Flood’s assessment (Derek Flood, “Substitutionary Atonement and the Church Fathers,” EQ 82.2 (2010), 142–159), as well as others, is correct that the Fathers held a more restorative justice paradigm as contrasted with the retributive justice paradigm of the later Reformed, then I think your premise would have merit. I do believe the Fathers held an objective form of the atonement in the sense of substitution, but I agree with you that it was not “overly-objective.” LA is not only a foreign concept in Eastern Orthodoxy, it was a foreign concept in the Western Church as well (if my interpretation of Augustine’s view of the extent of the atonement is accurate). I don’t think we have LA cropping up until Gottschalk in the ninth century. I suppose it would be “possible” to arrive at LA purely from the premise of unconditional individual election, but my point would be that even in Augustine, this did not happen.
As to Augustine’s turn to the individual in the decree is what precipitated such an objective turn in atonement models, that is something I had not considered before, but it certainly seems a possible scenario. I’ll need to think on it some more. Like Captain Kirk and Lieutenant Savak in “The Wrath of Khan,” when Savak said to Kirk, “that thought had never occurred to me,” Kirk responded, “well . . . now you have something new to think about!”
Posted by: David L. Allen | 2013.02.02 at 12:18 PM
Drs Gifford and Allen,
I appreciate the exchange between you. Thank you...
Posted by: peter lumpkins | 2013.02.02 at 01:10 PM
Dr. Gifford,
Thanks so much for your work on this. Very helpful, indeed.
Posted by: Eric Hankins | 2013.02.02 at 04:49 PM
Eric Hankins,
Very helpful in what?... It is much easier to criticize Augustinianism than to provide a detailed, systematic replacement for it. When can we expect you (or your traditionalist movement) to offer something thorough enough to be seriously considered as a replacement for the Augustinian theology---something to be submitted to a scrutiny equal that applied to Augustine? As I said to Jim regarding his paper above, it is not enough to criticize a theology. What is offered to replace it?
Posted by: Ken Hamrick | 2013.02.03 at 12:53 PM
One piece at a time, Ken (not answering for Eric, just for myself). That's the way Johnny built his Cadillac.
Fortunately, I don't believe we have to bring along anything new to replace it. The anthropology of the pre-Augustinian church (both east and west) is a sufficient place to begin. I'll work on it, but I can't produce a finished product in a couple of weeks.
Jim G.
Posted by: Jim G. | 2013.02.03 at 02:07 PM
Hi Ken,
This is the third time you have brought up the assertion that I have nothing with which to replace Augustinianism. You seem to have ignored my call (for now the third time) to revert to a pre-Augustinian anthropology. I have offered a replacement, one that is three centuries older, still fully viable as the anthropology of one of the three major families of Christianity, and in my opinion has fewer pitfalls than Augustinianism. I don't have to reinvent the wheel - all I need to do is change the tire.
As for your claim that Augustinianism has no match, well, you are certainly entitled to your opinion. It is an opinion that I do not share, obviously, and backing up your claim by the number of systematics books written really does not prove anything other than the abundance of Augustinian systematic texts. Neither does pointing back to the Reformation, since the three prominent magisterial reformers - Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin - were all fully committed Augustinians. You are correct that most informed Baptists operate out of some sort of Augustinian paradigm, but I think that occurs more by default than by anything else.
I haven't really tried to critique Augustinianism per se, though I do not agree with it. Instead, I think I have shown rather conclusively that Augustine's ideas listed below are an innovation into the tradition:
-Overemphasis on divine omnipotence
-Infralapsarian humanity via active original sin and original guilt
-Divine determinism
-Theological and anthropological dualism
300+ years passed between the apostles and the beginning of Augustine's teaching career. His ideas are nowhere to be found in those 300 years. John Gill and Steven Lawson have tried to revise history, but they have failed miserably. To say, with some of our Reformed brethren, that Augustine "rediscovered" the true understanding of nature and grace taught by the apostles is pure hogwash. He injected his interpretation into the tradition and, as I have shown, relied more heavily on his Manichean and Neo-Platonic past for his ideas than on either Scripture or the received tradition. He then forced his interpretation to fit Scripture by wrenching passages out of context (e. g. 1 Cor 4 and Rom 9), ignoring some (any that call for real human freedom apart from a particular work of grace), and completely redefining others (1 Tim 2:4). If that is the best systematic framework we have, it is time for a new model.
Jim G.
Posted by: Jim G. | 2013.02.04 at 10:34 AM
" Truth is systematic; and not even Baptists have done without it. Such systematic truth is reflected in the consistency and cohesiveness of the BF&M. "
The BFM has changed over the years which means "truth" has changed? Or what man deems is truth has changed? Changing words or adding to it means those before us missed it?
Is this where the insistence upon "following" an ST leads us? Do we fall into a trap of using a sort of man made syllabus to know Christ?
Posted by: Lydia | 2013.02.04 at 11:04 AM
All,
I want to be especially sensitive to guest contributors (like Dr. Gifford) on this site. In fact, I'm attempting to recruit some more guest contributors. I think one major reason some don't is the low-level of personal respect received from some commenters.
Those who follow this site know we have a very good track record for allowing dissent. Good questions--even difficult and hard questions--will always be welcome to pieces I post here whether by me or a guest. But hijacking a thread, pitching out needless personal insults or bringing baggage not germane to the topic all the while self-promoting one's blog remains out of the sphere of good discussion so far as I am concerned.
Hence, I decided to unpublish the comments above which derailed when one commenter logged the snide and needless remark toward Dr. Hankins. I think the thread deserves a little better. Hope all understands.
Know I appreciate your readership. Lord bless...
Posted by: peter lumpkins | 2013.02.04 at 12:47 PM
Lydia: First, it's amazing to me that 6 years ago the BFM was the end all to this group, the document by which all doctrine was measure. It was used as the litmus by Peter and others as to who was and was not SBC. Yet now that is not the case? That is what changes. Not the BFM which has only be changed slightly a few times to keep up with the changing times. I guess it boils down to whatever supports the cause one is currently in. That does change like the weather, the BFM and its basic truths, not so much.
Posted by: Debbie Kaufman | 2013.02.04 at 02:29 PM
Debbie, I think it was a big mistake to force missionaries to sign it. I understand that people from both sides view it as a parameter and engage when discussing doctrinal stances. I do know that some feel like I do about any doctrinal statement. While I agree with much of the trad statement I would never sign a doctrinal statement, creed or follow an ST. To me, that is not baptistic. Since I never have to worry about working in any SBC entity, this works for me.
Personally, I think we have come to the end of the BFM road. It has been parsed and stretched beyond recognition even to the point of discussing the intent/meaning of words chosen by some on the last committee as if it is the Constitution and they are Founding Fathers! That is when we know we have a man made document we have said we can agree on but in reality, don't, unless we get to define what it means. :o)
To sum up any confusion you might have: I am not a "side" person. I am an "issue" person.
I am mulling over the statement offered here that "truth is systematic". When the BFM was used as an example I immediately thought of the historical changes made to it. And thinking of my stint in the org systems world where systems always seem to evolve and not always in a good way, either. :o)
Posted by: Lydia | 2013.02.04 at 04:22 PM